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5. Service Infrastructure

Upon the formation of new settlements the provision of urban infrastructure becomes a significant concern for the responsible local authorities, as they are most directly affected by emerging demands and pressures. As will be evident in the chapter on social groups, once consolidated as an identifiable settlement the struggle for public services commences.

In the cases of Monte Alban and Mitla what is striking evident is

1. the complete absence of coordination between and among federal and state agencies which supply services, and
2. the lack of attention to INAH's formal responsibilities in relation to cultural resources protection and land use regulation in the buffer zones.

Services such as water, electricity, sewage, schools, sports facilities, or street pavement stem from the political pressure organized groups bring to bear on local officials. Thus an organized group may present a request for electrification, or water, and at first nothing happens; there is no response whatsoever. Nevertheless, after a few months the same group has learned the most effective way to present its case (which might be in association with other such settlements, or through the auspices or an intermediary organization, or even an elected official) and how to trade its political support to those who will work on the group's behalf, even if this means ignoring the responsibilities and representations of INAH.

This pattern of behavior, repeated time and time again, reveals two important factors in understanding the dilemmas of cultural resources protection. First, each agency is more inclined to respond to political pressures applied by external groups than it is to coordinate actions with other agencies. Despite claims of centralization in Mexican government there is very little effort to assure policy coordination or that agencies do not create problems for each other. Furthermore, state agencies are most attentive to what they hear from the governor, and the fact this may be inconsistent with federal policy is of less and less importance. Remember that federal policy presumably stresses protection for Monte Alban, and that did not stop the Oaxaca Housing Institute from putting thousands of units of public housing on Monte Alban, some of it only a few meters from the archaeological zone boundary. Second, INAH receives little attention and support because the Secretary of Education, as the cabinet officer responsible for INAH, has shown little interest in defending its responsibilities and priorities. INAH's leadership understands that effective performance means not embroiling the agency in conflictual circumstances likely to generate irate or perplexed calls from the Secretary's office. It also means that other agencies can carry out agendas which satisfy their constituencies even when this means ignoring or overriding INAH's formal responsibilities.

Consequently the spread of human settlement inside the archaeological zone boundary receives support from public agencies which extend their services without regard for the legality of such settlement. Almost all of the irregular settlements on Monte Alban have received electricity this way; in the mid-1990s Nueva Santa Maria de Atzompa aggressively lobbied, demanded, and threatened the Federal Electricity Commission to secure electrification. The Commission's internal policy states that as soon as a new urban population center includes a certain number of households it will begin to extend service, the rules, requirements, and responsibilities of other agencies notwithstanding. The Commission's actions both make the settlement a more attractive place to live, thereby encouraging further growth, and legitimize the demand-making process.

Providing water is the responsibility of the National Water Commission, and its criteria for installation of service has been overwhelming technical. In the case of Monte Alban it installed tanks for water distribution on the east slopes of Monte Alban right at the archaeological zone boundary, arguing that due to the gravity feed system no-one would settle uphill from the tanks. Nevertheless settlement has continued up past the tanks, and in the region of Xoxocotlan now is inside the Monte Alban boundary. The agency overlooked the fact that people recently arrived in irregular settlements are accustomed to do without piped water, and are accustomed to carry it long distances. In practice the tanks served to attract a high number of additional users and now are inadequate to meet the demands upon them.

The provision of schools follows much the same pattern, although here the focus of demands is a state rather than federal agency. Schools are a particularly important service from the standpoint of consolidating and legitimizing new settlements. Thus in some of the areas where INAH has struggled mightily to protect archaeological remains the IEEPO arrives to install primary schools at the behest of the new settlers. As in the case of the Federal Electrification Commission the IEEPO uses a formula to assess when a school should be built, but it also responds to political pressures and demands, providing schools without regard as to whether the land is archaeological, ejido, or communal. A walking inspection of Paraquito in Xoxocotlan and the canyon dividing Monte Alban from the Cerro de Monte Alban showed new schools in both places, located literally on the remains of pre-Columbian archaeological materials.

The installation of sewers generally falls to a combined project supported by local or state agencies and by the settlement itself through organized voluntary labor or tequio. The cost, complexity, and time required for a successful sewage project means these are most likely to be carried out in the "mature" settlements or in the subdivisions planned for this service. In new settlements the tendency is to defecate in the open air and to channel grey water into the streets, creating problems of pollution and disease. Infrastructure such as churches, markets, and sports facilities are more likely to be the result of small, persistent groups of interested people. Such projects may receive technical support, a loan of heavy equipment, or other assistance, and as all involve disturbing the soil all create the risk of disturbing subsurface remains.

In general terms one can say that efforts to provide infrastructure in an effort to solve the pressing problems of existing subdivisions or irregular settlements result in the arrival of additional residents drawn by access to services. The lack of planning and coordination among local, state, and national agencies means there is little opportunity to address long-term issues, as services tend to be provided in response immediate political demands. Unfortunately the short-term perspective and tendency to be reactive rather than proactive proves to generate even more chaos as well as further damage the integrity of the archaeological zone.

The substantial growth of tourism in Mitla over the past two decades, and the relative prosperity due at least in part to an expanding commerce in artisanry, generated a demand for attention to the community's infrastructure needs. From 1972 to 1982 the community gradually extended a sewage system along the principal streets of the center, in the process uncovering a number of burials and other evidence of pre-Columbian occupation of the site. While it was possible to carry out some salvage archaeology on the spot (Galan 1972 and Paddock 1983, in the Archives of the Archaeology Section of the CRO), in other cases residents opposed such work (Robles 1980, in the Archives of the Archaeology Section of the CRO). In 1990 the municipality paved a large number of streets in the center, ignoring INAH proposals for a work plan which would have permitted archaeological testing before opportunities disappeared under slabs of cement. The South group was closely invested with pavement, barring archaeologists from determining its original size before house lots parcelled it out. Expansion of the water system and drilling of additional wells followed the same pattern of lack of coordination.

Mitla is well-served by the Federal Electrification Commission; lines reach all parts of the community and the CFE has a local office to attend to needs and problems. However, lines and posts have been placed without regard to the cultural landscape and in ways which intrude on the quality of the experience the visitor will have. And the combination of electricity and disposable incomes means Mitla's rooftops are sprouting an increasing number of parabolic antennas, often those large two and three story block and concrete houses replacing the more traditional adobe homes. As with electric lines and posts the placement of these infringes on the visual landscape, creating a cumulative effect which cannot help but detract from the archaeological monuments.

Historically Mitla's schools were in the center or along the main highway which passes to the southwest of the archaeological site. But with the growing population to the north of the site there were increasing demands for a more accessible primary school. Finally school agency officials and the local government selected a site acceptable to them and to the local population, a site which infringes on the western portion of the Adobe group. The location makes it attractive for young families to continue settling in the area north of the archaeological zone, increasing the population density there. This is an increasing problem because the topography leads both sewage and summer storm run-off to channel through the archaeological zone, and in the mid-1990s a substantial retaining wall had to be built to protect parts of the Arroyo group from eroding away. But the most significant problem with the school location is that the decision by public bodies to site the school overlapping the Adobe group is that it legitimizes intrusions by others. After all, if protecting the site is so important why does government abuse it?

As this section suggests, one of the most significant dilemmas for cultural resources protection is the inability of INAH to use either formal authority or informal persuasion to generate cooperation from other agencies. Ironically, many local residents attribute damage done to sites under these circumstances as INAH's responsibility, even when it is has not participated in decisions or actions. In Mitla residents and businesses along the primary tourist circuit break through the pavement to make water or drainage connections, or to make repairs. They then leave the street broken and with holes on the understanding that it is up to INAH to correct the damage. That this posture is both self-serving and factually incorrect has no effect on the criticism INAH receives when holes go unfilled and tourists trip on the excavation debris.

At both sites the issue of urban infrastructure creates enormous headaches for effective protection. INAH lacks the authority, resources, and institutional capacity to shape infrastructure development. Agencies with this responsibility have little to gain by trying to resist pressures to provide infrastructure, even when they are aware doing so may damage sites physically or visually. Yet the provision of service infrastructure serves as a magnet for population and commerce. But in the end the central problem is not those seeking services, it is the lack of sensitivity among those charged with providing them. Unfortunately the tendency has been to treat INAH as a lightning rod, channelling criticism and unhappiness to an agency ill-prepared to address the developmental issues before it.